Causal versus constitutivo. ¿Dónde debemos trazar los límites de la mente?

• Toro, Juan ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Copenhagen
• Localización: Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía, ISSN-e 0120-0062, Vol. 67, Nº. Extra 4, 2018 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Lenguaje, mente y cognición), págs. 93-111
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n4Supl.73415
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Causal versus Constitutive Where to Draw the Boundaries of the Mind?
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    ¿Cómo saber qué entidades causan los procesos mentales y qué entidades los constituyen? La relevancia de esta pregunta cobra fuerza a partir de la objeción de Adams y Aizawa a la teoría de la mente extendida. Este artículo reconstruye algunos argumentos a favor la teoría de la mente extendida y del externalismo de la conciencia. Posteriormente, se evalúa la propuesta de Kirchhoff de una noción de constitución como una relación entre niveles. Actualmente la discusión carece de un acuerdo básico sobre los términos de la disputa, lo que hace indecidible el problema y debilita por igual la posición de ambas partes.

  • English

    How can we know which entities cause mental processes and which entities constitute them? The relevance of this question increased after Adams’ and Aizawa’s objection to the extended mind theory. The article reconstructs some of the arguments in favor of the extended mind theory and of the externalism of consciousness. It then evaluates Kirchhoff’s proposal of a notion of constitution as a relation between levels. There is currently no basic agreement regarding the terms of the controversy, which renders the problem undecidable and weakens both positions alike.

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