Desacuerdo sin falta y retractación: una defensa del relativismo sobre juicios de gusto

• Bordonaba, David ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Granada

     Universidad de Granada

     Granada, España

     
• Localización: Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía, ISSN-e 0120-0062, Vol. 68, Nº. 170, 2019, págs. 205-228
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v68n170.62774
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Faultless Disagreement and Recantation: A Defense of Relativism regarding Judgments of Taste
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen
  • español

    El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. Primero, analizar el desacuerdo sin falta, fenómeno central en el debate sobre el significado de los juicios de gusto, y examinar cómo las distintas posiciones que toman parte en dicho debate –contextualismo deíctico, contextualismo no deíctico y relativismo– dan cuenta de este fenómeno. Segundo, defender que tanto el contextualismo no deíctico como el relativismo pueden dar cuenta de él, pero que solo el segundo de ellos puede hacerlo a la vez que acomoda un fenómeno que parece central en la explicación de este tipo de desacuerdos, la retractación.

  • English

    The objective of the article is, first of all, to analyze faultless disagreement as a central element in judgments of taste and to examine three positions: deictic contextualism, non-deictic contextualism, and relativism. Secondly, it shows how deictic contex-tualism and relativism account for that phenomenon and argues that only the latter can do so and at the same time accommodate a central feature of those disagree-ments: recantation.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Baker, C. “Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges from Disagreement.” Philosophical Studies 157.1 (2012): 107-123.
  • Brogaard, B. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78.2 (2009): 439-467.
  • Carter, A. “Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision.” Erkenntnis, 79. supp. 1 (2014): 155-172.
  • Egan, A. “There’s Something Funny about Comedy: A Case Study in Faultless Disagreement.” Erkenntnis 79. supp. 1 (2014): 73-100.
  • Field, H. “Epistemology without Metaphysics.” Philosophical Studies 143.2 (2009): 249-290.
  • Glanzberg, M. “Context, Content, and Relativism.” Philosophical Studies 136.1 (2007): 1-29.
  • Kaplan, D. “Demonstratives.” Themes from Kaplan. Eds. Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989....
  • Kölbel, M. “Faultless Disagreement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104
  • (2004): 53-73.
  • Kölbel, M. “The Evidence for Relativism.” Synthese 166.2 (2009): 375-395.
  • Kölbel, M. “Relativism 1: Representational Content.” Philosophy Compass 10.1 (2015a): 38-51.
  • Kölbel, M. “Relativism 2: Semantic Content.” Philosophy Compass 10.1 (2015b): 52-67.
  • Lasersohn, P. “Context Dependence, Disagreement and Predicates of Personal Taste.” Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2005): 643-686.
  • López de Sa, D. “Presuppositions of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement.” Relative Truth. Eds. Manuel García Carpintero...
  • López de Sa, D. “Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist Relativist Account.” Erkenntnis 80 (2015): 153-165.
  • MacFarlane, J. “Future Contingents and Relative Truth.” The Philosophical Quaterly 53.212 (2003): 321-336.
  • MacFarlane, J. “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Vol. 1, Eds. Tamar S. Gendler and John...
  • MacFarlane, J. “Relativism and Disagreement.” Philosophical Studies 132.1 (2007): 17-31.
  • MacFarlane, J. “Epistemic Modals Are Assessment Sensitivity.” Epistemic Modality. Eds. Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. Oxford: Oxford University...
  • MacFarlane, J. “Relativism and Knowledge Attributions.” The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Eds. Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard....
  • MacFarlane, J. Assessment-Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Marques, T. “Relative Correctness.” Philosophical Studies 167 (2014): 361-373.
  • Marques, T. “Retractions.” Synthese 195.8 2015): 1–25. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0852- 8.
  • Predelli, S. “Utterance, Interpretation and the Logic of Indexicals.” Mind and Language 13.3 (1998): 400-414.
  • Richard, M. When Truth Gives Out. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
  • Schaffer, J. “Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals.” Epistemic Modality. Eds. Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. Oxford: Oxford...
  • Schlenker, P. “Context of Thought and Context of Utterance: A Note on Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present.” Mind and Language...
  • Stojanovic, I. “Talking about Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30.6 (2007): 691-706.
  • Sundell, T. “Disagreements about Taste.” Philosophical Studies 155.2 (2011): 267-288.
  • Sundell, T. “The Tasty, the Bold and the Beautiful.” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56.6 (2016): 793-818.