La pregunta por la composición material como una pregunta sobre límites

• Gonzalo Germán Núñez Erices ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Sheffield

     University of Sheffield

     Reino Unido

     
• Localización: Estudios de Filosofía, ISSN-e 2256-358X, ISSN 0121-3628, Nº. 59, 2019, págs. 97-120
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.17533/udea.ef.n59a05
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The question about material composition as a question about boundaries
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Desde que Peter van Inwagen en su libro Material Beings (1990) planteó La Pregunta Especial por la Composición, mucho se ha escrito sobre cuáles son las condiciones para que dos o más objetos materiales compongan juntos un objeto. Este artículo propone un estudio de la composición con relación a la noción de límite. La pregunta por la composición implica trazar un límite que determine cuándo esta ocurre y cuándo no. Hay tres respuestas tradicionales: restrictivismo, uni¬versalismo y nihilismo. Mientras para el restrictivismo la composición ocurre ocasionalmente, el universalismo y nihilismo sostienen que la composición ocurre siempre o nunca respectivamente. No obstante, pese a las respuestas opuestas de estos dos últimos, hay un objetivo que los vincula: evitar la existencia de límites ontológicamente vagos para la composición material. Así, cómo tracemos un límite determinará qué tipo de entidades aceptamos como componentes del mundo.

  • English

    Since Peter van Inwagen in his book Material Beings (1990) raised The Special Composition Question, many lines have been written about the conditions for two or more material objects to compose a further object. This paper proposes a study of the relationship between composition and the notion of boundary. The question about composition entails drawing a boundary to determine when it occurs and when it does not. There are three traditional answers: restrictivism, universal¬ism, and nihilism. While according to restrictivism, composition occurs occasionally, according to universalism and nihilism, it occurs either always or never respectively. Nonetheless, despite the opposition of these two answers, both have a common target: to avoid the existence of ontologi¬cally vague boundaries for material composition. Thus, how a boundary is drawn will determine what kind of things we accept as components of the world.

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