Microfisicalismo y el alcance del argumento del zombi

• Autores: Reinaldo Bernal
• Localización: Estudios de Filosofía, ISSN-e 2256-358X, ISSN 0121-3628, Nº. 59, 2019, págs. 45-64
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.17533/udea.ef.n59a03
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    El argumento del zombi, formulado por Chalmers (1996) contra la tesis según la cual la con¬ciencia fenomenal es una propiedad de naturaleza física, supone que toda propiedad de un sistema físico compuesto superviene (lógicamente) a partir de sus constituyentes fundamentales. En este texto, desarrollo en qué consiste esta suposición y muestro que la filosofía de la física brinda bue¬nas razones para cuestionarla. En este orden de ideas, concluyo que el argumento del zombi no descarta una posición sobre la conciencia que la conciba como una propiedad física emergente, en el sentido de la emergencia-S (Howard, 2007). Termino discutiendo algunas objeciones.

  • English

    Chalmers’ (1996) zombie argument against physicalism (or ‘materialism’) about (phenomenal) consciousness supposes that every property of a composed physical system supervenes (logically) on the system’s fundamental constituents. In this paper, I discuss the significance of this supposition and I show that the philosophy of physics provides good grounds to resist it. As a result, I conclude that the zombie argument does not rule out a physicalist view of consciousness that conceives it as emergent in the sense of S-emergence (Howard, 2007). I finish by discussing some objections.

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