Acceso usuarios
Isabella Eiselt, Johannes Pollak, Peter Slominski
The article analyses the potential of Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) for resolving conflicts in the field of EU budgetary policy. In the 1970s and 1980s, annual budgetary procedures were characterised by intense interinstitutional battles, mainly between the Council and the European Parliament. IIAs concluded during this period tried to clarify pertinent Treaty provisions, but proved to be insufficient to resolve budgetary conflicts stemming from the more general problem of the uneven allocation of budgetary and legislative power between the two institutions involved. It was not before the fundamental budgetary reform in 1988—agreed upon by the European Council and implemented through an IIA along with the gradually increased role in legislative politics granted to European Parliament through several Treaty amendments—that budgetary stability—arrived. Hence, IIAs can be regarded as an improper means to solve profound constitutional problems. Yet, they can be considered as suitable tools to arrange technical details.
