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In order to advance substantive equality under the Charter through the section 15(1) framework, Canadian courts should shift towards a vulnerability-centric model that focuses on protecting individuals and groups who experience vulnerability based on enumerated or analogous grounds. In adjudicating claims under section 15(1), Canadian courts have occasionally invoked the notion of "vulnerability."However, the courts have yet to engage in a thorough discussion of the term's meaning and implications across specific contexts. This article explores the meaning and contours of "vulnerability" and analyzes the prospect ofusefully integrating vulnerability into the section 15(1) framework. This includes a discussion of how the section 15(1) test as currently formulated "falls short," and how the advancement of a juridical theory of vulnerability can remedy several key shortcomings. This article explores vulnerability through the lens of Inglis v British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety), examining how a vulnerability-centric model might operate based on lessons learned from Inglis. Four themes of vulnerability emerge: resource imbalances, dependency, physicaland/or mental condition, and marginalization. This article concludes with the observation that, although the vulnerability-centric model is not without its flaws, its weaknesses are outweighed by its strengths in terms of advancing substantive equality.
