Acceso usuarios
Amit Sachdeva
States have customarily tended to compete with one another. Not always, however, is this tendency, or the underlying methods put to use, obvious. That states (provincial divisions in the US) were competing to attract incorporations by relaxing their regulatory standards, couldn’t be seriously observed and highlighted until mid-1970s. Today, a few would doubt the existence of regulatory competition in corporate law in the US. In this paper, the author examines the issue whether the EU is (likely to be) engaged in regulatory competition in the area of company law. Answering the question in affirmative, the author proceeds to examine the strength of the race to the bottom and the race to the top theories, as developed and argued in the US, for the European setting. Since the legal systems of Member States of the EU have certain very disparate “core values” along which those systems have historically developed, relaxation of standards in the EU would take place against different variables. Because of the multitude of variables, comparable variables are unlikely to yield comparable results; either of the race theories is unlikely to satisfactorily predict the regulatory behaviour of EU Member States. Instead, since “laxation” in respect of one variable would be met by “optimisation” in respect of the other, there is likely to be simultaneous races to the top and to the bottom among the EU Member States.
