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Since the 1970s, national governments across Western Europe have decentralized significant powers to subnational authorities. Recent work has found that the degree of decentralization affects ethnoterritorial party vote in national and subnational elections. This article asks the prior question: what effect does decentralization have on a party's decision to field candidates? I find that as decentralization reforms shift power to the region, ethnoterritorial parties likewise shift their electoral strategy away from contesting national elections. An examination of regional-level data from nine Western European countries reveals ethnoterritorial parties reduce their contestation of national elections when a directly elected regional assembly is established and significant administrative, fiscal and policymaking competencies are transferred to the region. Further supporting the view of decentralization as policy appeasement, this exit effect is limited to ethnoterritorial parties demanding regional autonomy; secessionist parties continue to pursue full contestation strategies regardless of the level of decentralization.
