Acceso usuarios
Yann Kerevel, Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez
¿Basta con que haya competitividad para que los gobernantes respondan a los intereses de sus representados? Investigaciones recientes sobre México sugieren que incluso sin reelección, la competitividad ha mejorado el desempeño gubernamental. Empero, estas pesquisas se basan en datos agregados que no logran probar la relación individual entre competitividad electoral y representación. En este texto examinamos dicha relación mediante un análisis individual de la actividad legislativa medida como presentación de iniciativas y direccionamiento de recursos por parte de los diputados federales. Nuestros hallazgos confirman que la competitividad incentiva la postulación de candidatos calificados, pero cuestionan que la competitividad afecte el comportamiento legislativo a nivel individual. Ello implica que, por sí mismas, las elecciones competitivas no son suficientes para inducir responsividad
Is increasing electoral competition sufficient to improve democratic responsiveness? Recent research on Mexico suggests electoral competition, even without reelection, has increased democratic representation. Such works are primarily based on aggregate data and fails to test the relationship between electoral competition and individual responsiveness. Here, we examine the relationship between increased electoral competition and legislative behavior by using individual-level data on career paths, bill sponsorship and pork-barreling from Mexican federal deputies before and after the democratic transition. The findings suggest an increasingly competitive environment leads to more qualified candidates. However, there is no evidence that competition has an individual level effect on legislative behavior. The implication of these findings is that elections, by themselves, are not sufficient to induce responsiveness
