La partición de un cartel: votaciones nominales y guerra faccional en la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal

• Eric Magar ^[1]
  1. [1] Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

     Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

     México

     
• Localización: Revista uruguaya de ciencia politica, ISSN 0797-9789, ISSN-e 1688-499X, Vol. 26, 1 1, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Poderes legislativos, representación y partidos en América Latina), págs. 35-58
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • A Cartel’s Split: Roll Call Votes and factional warfare in the Federal District’s Legislative Assembly
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    La teoría del cartel procedimental de Cox y McCubbins predice conflicto mínimo o incluso nulo en el seno del partido mayoritario en votaciones plenarias. Esto es consecuencia del control férreo de la agenda legislativa que ejercen miembros clave del partido. El estudio de las votaciones nominales de la IVa Legislatura de la Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal (2006–09) descubre escisiones frecuentes del partido mayoritario en la sesión plenaria. La estimación de puntos ideales de los diputados a partir de sus votaciones nominales revela dos líneas de segmentación en la Asamblea. Una contrapone izquierda y derecha clásicas en temas socioeconómicos. La otra se asocia con los nombramientos de las autoridades electorales de la ciudad. Si el PRD de centro-izquierda se mostró unido en la primera dimensión, la presencia de dos facciones enfrentadas es manifiesta en la segunda. El trabajo especula sobre la necesidad de teorizar acerca de instrumentos de control de la agenda de las etapas más tardías del proceso legislativo

  • English

    Cox and McCubbins’ procedural cartel theory expects majority party conflict in final passage votes to be reduced to a minimum. This is a consequence of agenda control by key party members. I inspect roll call voting in the 4th Legislature of Mexico City’s Assembly (2006-09) uncovering a frequent majority party split in the plenary. Ideal point estimation with roll call data reveals two lines of Assembly cleavage, one the classic left-right divide on economic issues, the other mostly related to appointments of officers at different levels. While the left-leaning PRD majority showed cohesion in the first dimension, the presence of two distinct factions is manifest in the second. The paper speculates about the need for more theory on late-stage agenda control instruments in the legislative process.

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