La organización de las legislaturas democráticas

• Gary W. Cox ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Stanford
• Localización: Revista uruguaya de ciencia politica, ISSN 0797-9789, ISSN-e 1688-499X, Vol. 26, 1 1, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Poderes legislativos, representación y partidos en América Latina), págs. 13-34
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The Organization of Democratic Legislatures
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Referencias bibliográficas
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