Acceso usuarios
Timothy J. Furlan
Solon’s extraordinary claim, that we should call “no one happy who is still living” (τέλος ὁρᾶν), presents a fascinating and distinctive argument about happiness and the length of a human life. The issues Solon raises are important, and even if we think his pessimistic conclusion is an exaggeration we can still appreciate his central concern how conceptions of happiness and the length of a human life are connected. The purpose of this paper is to explore a few of these problems, in particular the reason why Aristotle’s reply to Solon in the Nicomachean Ethics is somewhat ambiguous. We find Aristotle addressing Solon’s claim at the outset of Eth. Nic. A 10, troubled in one sense by its conclusion, yet struck by its partial truth. On the one hand, he thinks that εὐδαιμονία requires a “complete life” (βίος τέλειος), or at the very least, a sufficient and “complete span of time” (τέλειος χρόνος), both of which are compatible with Solon’s advice that we should postpone calling someone happy until a later point in life. But on the other hand Aristotle defines εὐδαιμονία in such a way that raises the question whether he needs to accept Solon’s claim in any form. In particular, if happiness is defined in terms of excellent activity (ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν), as Aristotle repeatedly claims, why should we wait until a person dies to call him or her happy? Why shouldn’t excellent actions, at the very time they are performed, count someone as happy? The puzzle, in short, is the fact that Aristotle defines happiness in terms of ἐνέργειαι, activities that are complete without developing over time, and yet also claims that happiness requires a “complete lifetime”, a βίος τέλειος.
