A regra da maioria como agregação de preferências: questões e respostas

• Autores: Arnaldo Mauerberg Junior, Eduardo Strachman
• Localización: Nova Economia, ISSN 0103-6351, Año 24, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 297-316
• Idioma: portugués
• DOI: 10.1590/0103-6351/1831
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • português

    Ancorado na abordagem racionalista, mas na impossibilidade da regra consensual e buscando apresentar as características da regra da maioria e alguns de seus problemas, como o paradoxo de Condorcet, e soluções a esses problemas, como o logrolling, este artigo se propõe a revisar e sintetizar a teoria a respeito, baseado nas principais contribuições ao tema. O estudo se justifica porque, como processo de agregação de preferências, a regra da maioria se destaca para usos eleitorais e de processos políticos internos, em um elevado número de nações.

  • English

    Anchored in the rationalist approach, but with the impossibility of consensus rule and seeking to show the characteristics of the majority rule and some of its problems, as the Condorcet paradox, and solutions to these problems, such as logrolling, this article intends to review and synthesize theory about it, based on the main contributions to the theme. The study is justified because, as a process of preference aggregation, majority rule is used for election purposes and internal political processes in a large number of nations.

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