Acceso usuarios
Elsa Piersig
Canada’s recent run of hung parliaments (2004‐2011) gave rise to a number of proposals intended to stabilize minority government. One such proposal recommends fixing the confidence convention by adopting a constructive vote of non‐confidence that requires non‐confidence votes to simultaneously elect a new head of government. Aucoin, Jarvis and Turnbull suggest that constructive non‐confidence will increase parliamentary stability, legitimize mid‐term transitions and reduce executive dominance. Yet, a cursory investigation of research on the constructive non‐confidence votes demonstrates a dearth of evidence on the rule’s effects. This article fills this gap by reviewing other jurisdictions’ experiences with constructive non‐confidence in order to unpack how the rule might work within the Canadian context. The comparative research demonstrates that though constructive non‐confidence will enhance parliamentary stability, it will do so at the cost of decreasing the legitimacy of mid‐term transitions and bolstering executive dominance over parliament.
