Acceso usuarios
Kai Oppermann
After the defeat of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in the French and Dutch referendums, governments across Europe had little appetite for popular votes on the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, nine of the ten countries which were committed to (or had held) referendums on the TCE got around such votes on Lisbon. The article investigates how it was possible for governments in these nine countries to avoid putting the treaty to the people despite the precedent set by the TCE. It will be argued that three factors were crucial in this regard: first, the European-level collusion between governments; second, domestic political changes during the ‘period of reflection’: and third, governing strategies of depoliticising the decisions against referendums. Thus, the politics of avoiding referendums could only succeed due to the interplay between the determined agency of governments at the European and domestic levels and auspicious domestic contexts of ratification.
