Un nuevo adversario de la libertad como no-dominación

• Autores: Hugo Omar Seleme
• Localización: Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, ISSN 1575-6823, ISSN-e 2340-2199, Vol. 17, Nº 33, 2015, págs. 59-82
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.12795/araucaria.2015.i33.03
• Títulos paralelos:
  • A new adversary of freedom as non-domination
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen
  • español

    Philip Pettit ha utilizado la libertad positiva y negativa de Isaiah Berlin para dos propósitos diferentes. En primer lugar, la distinción es empleada para elaborar un ideal distinguible de libertad como no-dominación que contiene elementos propios de la libertad negativa y la libertad positiva. En segundo lugar, Pettit sostiene que la libertad como no-dominación es más atractiva que la libertad negativa defendida por Berlin –la libertad como no-interferencia– y una variedad de libertad positiva que Berlin critica –la libertad como participación o populismo.

    Este trabajo sostiene que existe una tensión entre estos dos objetivos. Una vez que se elabora una concepción distinguible de libertad como no dominación no es posible argüir que es más atractiva que las alternativas rivales. Específicamente, los argumentos que Pettit ha formulado en contra de la libertad positiva no tienen ningún impacto sobre una variante de libertad positiva que, por un lado, identifica libertad con control y, por el otro, identifica al control con la existencia de instituciones republicanas.

  • English

    Philip Pettit has used Isaiah Berlin's positive and negative freedom for two different purposes. First, the distinction is employed to elaborate a third distinguishable ideal of freedom as non-domination that contains elements of both the negative and the positive freedom. Second, Pettit contends that freedom as non-domination is more attractive than the negative freedom defended by Berlin - freedom as non-interference - and a variant of positive freedom criticized by Berlin - freedom as participation or populism.

    The paper holds that there is a tension between these two objectives. Once a distinguishable conception of freedom as non-domination is elaborated it is not possible to argue that it is more attractive than the rival alternatives. Specifically, the arguments that Pettit have addressed against populist positive freedom have no impact over a variant of positive freedom that identify liberty with control, and control with republican institutions.

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