Acceso usuarios
Michael Asimow
Regulatory and benefit-distribution schemes give rise to large numbers of individualized disputes between government agencies and private parties. Every country needs a system of administrative adjudication to resolve such disputes accurately, fairly, and efficiently.
Such systems generally provide for three phases—initial decision, administrative reconsideration, and judicial review. However, the details of the various systems employed around the world are bewilderingly diverse, and different countries tend to invest most of their adjudicatory resources in only one of the three phases (and private parties who have a dispute with government tend to have more confidence in one of the phases than in the other two).
This Article proposes a methodology for classifying such systems. It identifies four key variables: combined-function agencies or separate tribunals, adversarial or inquisitorial procedure, judicial review that is either open to introduction of new evidence or closed to new evidence, and judicial review by generalized or specialized courts.
The Article identifies five models in common use around the world that involve different combinations of these variables. The United States, for example, uses combined-function agencies, adversarial procedure, and closed judicial review in generalist courts. On the other hand, the United Kingdom employs an independent tribunal to reconsider initial agency decisions. And France employs open judicial review in a specialized court. Each of these models can deliver accurate and efficient decisions while preserving fairness.
Finally, the Article discusses transplants from one administrative adjudicatory system to another. There are numerous examples of successful transplants. The Article suggests that the United States should consider adopting a social security tribunal (similar to the tribunals in the United Kingdom and Australia) to replace the present system of adjudication of social security disputes.
