Acceso usuarios
Neville Cox
In the last twenty five years there have been at least three major global controversies – those involving Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, the publication of various cartoons in Denmark's Jyllands Posten newspaper, and the publication on YouTube of a film entitled Innocence of Muslims—where the Islamic world has reacted with outrage to what were regarded as grossly offensive blasphemous publications by western publishers. Many (western) commentators, writing in the context of these controversies, expressed the view that it was always and inherently unacceptable for the law to prohibit the exercise of freedom of expression on the basis that the expression in question was offensive to religious sensitivities or blasphemous. This article critically analyses this viewpoint. It notes that the outrage generated by these publications was felt both from the perspective of individual Muslims but, more importantly, it was also felt at a corporate level by Islamic society generally and on the basis that blasphemy against God and against sacred elements of Islam is profoundly immoral in so far as Islamic society is concerned. It is contended that, certainly within Europe, the concept of speech being restricted because it is profoundly immoral and consequently profoundly offensive from a societal standpoint is well known – and is manifest in, for example, laws prohibiting holocaust denial. It is concluded therefore, that the objection to a blasphemy law lies in the fact that what is at stake is speech which is irreligious and thus that the difference in approach of that section of the Islamic world that would like to see increasingly stringent blasphemy laws or laws against defamation of religion and that section of the western world that regards such laws as anathema, lies in the fact that religion forms a key element of the public morality of Islamic society but not of western society. It is further concluded that the vehemence of the objections of such western commentators is fuelled by a failure to understand the significance for the religiously devout of their religious beliefs as their primary point of self-identification, and reflects more broadly the fact that it may be simply impossible for someone who is not religious, to understand the nature of religion and consequently, the nature of religious sensitivities.
