Acceso usuarios
Juan Ruiz Manero 
The paper critically examines Bobbio's famous disctinction between legal positivism as a method, a theory and an ideology. The author first highlights certain problems of the distinction itself and then focuses on Bobbio's self-determined position within it. Delving on Bobbio's analysis of the concepts of basic norm and rule of recognition, he demonstrates how Bobbio's later rejection of these two concepts implies acceptance of positivistic legal theory and ideology – despite the fact that he explicitly rejected them in the first place. The reason for this Bobbio's slip is found in his absorbtion in the positivist legal culture which is permeated with the internal point of view on the law. The author suggests rejecting Bobbio's tripartite disctinction of legal positivism and proposes instead to view this as a set of seldom indvisible standpoints forming a specific legal culture.
