Acceso usuarios
Stuart N. Soroka, Christopher Wlezien
Although previous research demonstrates that proportionality positively impacts the congruence between the positions of the government and the public after elections, recent work argues and shows that proportionality dampens policy responsiveness in between elections. Why this is true is unclear, however. This paper considers how proportionality matters for policy responsiveness, focusing on two primary suspects: (1) the friction associated with coalitions in proportional systems and (2) the comparatively weaker electoral incentives in those systems. In this paper we first assess the general effect of electoral systems, showing that results are robust across measures, and also that the impact of electoral systems increases exponentially alongside party fragmentation. We then examine two alternative mechanisms at work in proportional systems, and preliminary results point towards the potential importance of government fractionalization in accounting for weakened inter-election responsiveness. In the concluding section we consider implications for our understanding of democratic representation, and also for future research on opinion-policy congruence.
