Acceso usuarios
Jukka Snell
The European Court of Justice has spoken in Gauweiler. In 128 closely reasoned paragraphs the Court finds that the questions of the German Constitutional Court are admissible, but that the ECB has neither overstepped its monetary policy mandate nor violated the prohibition of central bank financing in art.123(1) TFEU. The reasoning does not invoke the nature or the spirit of the Treaties; instead this is a legalistic and technical judgment. It draws from the earlier Pringle ruling, and considers carefully the wording of the relevant rules and their origin. Nowhere is there any sign of emotion - the decision is a product of cool-headed legal rationality. A simple reading would give an impression that this is just another preliminary ruling. Yet, given the unique background of the case, there is a danger that the judgment is a step in a process where the eurocrisis becomes a constitutional crisis. However, even here might lie an opportunity.
The background is well known. Briefly, in the midst of the most acute phase of the eurocrisis in 2012 the ECB introduced the Outright Monetary Transactions programme. Under it, the ECB is prepared to buy ex ante unlimited amounts of government bonds if certain conditions are fulfilled. This promise of intervention convinced the markets that there was little risk of the break-up of euro. The ECB had bought time for the political leaders. However, the programme was challenged in the German Constitutional Court.4 The Constitutional Court found that the ECB had both exceeded its mandate and violated art.123(1) TFEU. It also took the view that this was manifest and structurally significant, allowing it to oppose the ECB actions despite the principle of primacy but in accordance with the doctrines the Constitutional Court had developed. However, it sent the case to Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling, giving the European Court an opportunity to concur. The European Court has now declined to do so. What next?
