Acceso usuarios
Mark Chinen
This article argues that a gap that has always existed in the law of state responsibility is now becoming more apparent. That gap divides a state from its citizens, making it difficult to justify why state responsibility should be distributed to them. Purely legal approaches to the issue are not likely to resolve the problem, and although the literature of moral collective responsibility suggests some bases for having citizens share the costs of state responsibility, none are completely satisfying. Concepts from complexity theory show why this is so. If the theory is correct, the state is neither a legal abstraction nor reducible to the individuals who purportedly comprise it. Instead, it is an emergent phenomenon that arises from complex interactions among individuals, formal and informal subgroups, and the conceptual tools and structures that individuals and subgroups use to comprehend and respond to their physical and social environments. The theory is consistent with a basic premise of international law that the state as such is an appropriate bearer of responsibility. However, because in a complex system there is no linear connection between the emergent phenomenon and its underlying constituents, this suggests that the divide between a state and its citizens in the distribution of state responsibility may never be bridged.
