Acceso usuarios
The new institutional framework of subsidiarity is expected to lower the EU democratic deficit. In contrast to this optimistic scenario, I argue that the success of subsidiarity depends on its capacity to unravel the EU's "substantive" democratic deficit. Linked to the Union's functionalist institutional design, this dimension of the democratic deficit has developed due to two limitations of EU-level politics. First, the EU functionalist design has narrowed the range of topics open to democratic debate (horizontal substantive democratic deficit). Second, the proportion of the debate which we could genuinely describe as being political is declining as a result of the de-politicisation of EU goals, underpinned by a massive accumulation of allegedly apolitical expert knowledge (vertical substantive democratic deficit). Against this background, I contend that by involving actors relatively alien to the EU functionalist thinking, subsidiarity could offer an opportune ground for the re-politicisation of democratic "blind spots" in EU policy making.
