"A Rule-Governed Gunman Writ Large?" El puesto de la Coerción en "The Concept of law"

• Autores: Anna Pintore
• Localización: Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, ISSN-e 2386-4702, ISSN 0214-8676, Nº 37, 2014, págs. 125-142
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.14198/doxa2014.37.08
• Títulos paralelos:
  • «A Rule-Governed Gunman Writ Large?» The rol of coertion in The Concept of Law
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen
  • español

    Frente a las opiniones que consideran que la coerción ha ido perdiendo su lugar central en la teoría del Derecho y sitúan el comienzo de esta tendencia en El concepto de derecho, este artículo trata de reivindicar el tratamiento de la coerción por parte de Hart en tres momentos de su obra: 1) el análisis de las reglas y de las obligaciones sociales; 2) la crítica a Austin y Kelsen y la elaboración de la teoría de los legal systems; y 3) el tratamiento del contenido mínimo del derecho natural y del derecho internacional. La conclusión de la autora es que «El concepto de derecho no marca en absoluto una ruptura de la tradición iuspositivista en tema de coerción sino que se coloca en línea de continuidad con ella».

  • English

    Objecting to those who claim that coercion has been losing its central role in Legal Theory and considered that the point of departure of that new tendency is to be found in The concept of Law, this paper vindicates Harts way to address the topic on coercion in three moments of his work: 1) His analyses of rules and social obligation; 2) His objection against Austin and Kelsen and his elaboration of a theory of legal systems; 3) His way to address the minimum content of Natural Law and International Law. The conclusion of this paper is to consider The concept of Law fully align with the iuspositivist tradition on this issue rejecting it to be any departure or turning point.

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