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Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they �aim at truth� or �ought to fit� the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they �aim at realization� or the world �ought to fit� them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no such determinable because of ineliminable asymmetries between the way that beliefs �aim at truth� and the way that desires (or intentions) �aim at realization.� This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event.
