Discussion of �equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting�

• Autores: Iván Marinovic
• Localización: Review of Accounting Studies, ISSN-e 1573-7136, Vol. 19, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 1078-1085
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9287-6
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• Resumen

  • Dutta and Fan (Rev Account Stud, 2014), this issue, study the implications of earnings management on managerial compensation, in a two-period LEN setting. They analyze the level as well as the evolution of compensation. Furthermore, they consider the possibility of joint moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I discuss the empirical implications of their analysis, in the context of a slightly more general dynamic setting, and examine the robustness of some of their results with respect to the assumption that the principal can enforce claw-backs.