Acceso usuarios
Luigi Ferrajoli 
This essay discusses José Juan Moreso's rationalist theory of moral objectivism. According to Moreso, a selected group of moral principles (and values, reasons and norms) is valid in any human context, and moral judgments are capable of being true or false. The paper provides a defense of the rational argumentation in ethical matters but refuses the thesis of correspondence of reason and truth. From an anti-objectivist and a non-cognitivist conception of ethics, Moreso's thesis cannot be accepted. A moral principle can be rational justified (or not) without references on his truth (or falsehood). If it is possible to adduce arguments rationally about different moral, political and philosophical thesis, it is needed to infer that none of them can be true in the same sense that scientific or historical facts are. Disagreements in ethics depends on differences in basic values and a reduction of distances is possible only if the discussants share the same basic values- like democracy, equality or freedom. Moral objectivism is not compatible with liberalism, because this political doctrine entails moral and cultural pluralism. The only coherent moral objectivism is the religious one and it is related to a divine natural law. It brings to heteronomy. On the contrary, the secular ethics is based on an autonomous choice of the subject, that acts not because of the will of God, but its own will. The concept of Moreso's moral objectivism is empty, because there are not relevant moral principles (like them about divorce, abortion, same-sex marriage) that are valid in any context. Not even the fundamental values that are affirmed in contemporary rigid constitutions are shared by everybody; they can play a role against the will and the opinion of contingent majorities in order to defend civil liberties and social rights of all citizens.
