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In the first section of the paper, the author outlines a non-cognitivist metaethics, based on the is-ought distinction and Hume's principle. Nevertheless, the author maintains that logical reasoning is possible in the ethical domain. Valuejudgments and normative sentences, although lacking truth values, can be proved within a (moral, legal, or political) normative system on the basis of the accepted normative premises of the system at stake. Any inferential move, however, cannot but stop when reaching the "supreme principle" of the system. In the second section, the author claims for a non-logical, pragmatic, connection between meta-ethics and normative ethics, viz. between non-cognitivism and liberalism. Liberal ethics, i.e. the ethics of tolerance, does provide good pragmatic reasons for joining non-cognitivistic meta-ethics, and vice versa, while non-liberal intolerant ethics, in turn, provides good pragmatic reasons for joining a cognitivist meta-ethics, and vice versa.
