Acceso usuarios
Josep Joan Moreso 
In this paper, the author intends to show that there is no conceptual connection between ethical relativism, legal positivism and political liberalism. First, stipulative definitions of these terms are presented. Secondly, several arguments are presented and refuted according to which political liberalism and legal positivism presuppose ethical relativism. If ethical relativism is conceived as a meta-ethical thesis, denying that there is a privileged set of moral reasons irrespective of any context, then it cannot imply a normative conclusion without violating Hume's Law. If ethical relativism is characterised as a normative thesis, which does not allow for some moral judgements to be considered more justified than others, then liberal toleration is extended until its collapse. The suggestion that moral relativism has only a pragmatic connection with political liberalism -similar to a conversational implication-is considered a contingent and contextual consequence and, therefore, rejected too. There is, in conclusion, no conceptual implication from ethical relativism to political liberalism and democracy.
