Acceso usuarios
Clare Woodford
This article examines Cavell's critique of Rawlsian citizenship, namely that Rawls� desire to seek a democratic way of life in which citizens can reassure themselves that their behaviour has been �above reproach� reflects a distorted and hence inadequate conception of the demands of the moral life. Although the aim to be �above reproach� was only expressed in Rawls� �A Theory of Justice�, I extend Stephen Mulhall's work to show that Cavell's concern holds not only for Rawls� �Political Liberalism� but also �The Idea of Public Reason Revisited�. Having shown that Rawls did not attend to this concern, I then demonstrate the importance of Cavell's argument in the practical context of responding to resentment in democracy. I examine the challenging case of supporters of the BNP's extremist politics, arguing that Rawlsian public reason potentially restricts justice in a way avoided by Cavell's, albeit more demanding, appeal to conversation.
