Is Thinking a Matter of Knowing?

• Autores: Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio
• Localización: Agora: papeles de filosofía, ISSN 0211-6642, Vol. 32, Nº 1, 2013, págs. 27-41
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.15304/ag.32.1.1123
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Referencias bibliográficas
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