Resumen de Public supply of optional standardized consumer contracts: a rationale for the Common European Sales Law?

Thomas Ackermann

• Byreadingthe B2C partofthe Common European Sales Law (CESL) as a supplyof optional standardizedcontracts, this article tries togive the Commission's proposal the best possible rationale. In contrast to conventional contract codes characterized by loos ebundles of defaul trules the parties may selectively stick to o rdiverge from, an optional standardized contract is a tight bundle of defaul trules with a nameat tachedto it. As optional standardized contract sare simply identifiable by their label, they can theoretically solve the problem of reading costs and thusavoid adverse selection. This idea help stomake sense ofthe rigid internalstructureofthe CESL that generally exclude scherry-picking. From this perspective, itis also un objectionable for the CESL to aimat an up scalesegment of consumers by offering a high level of protection (leading to correspondingly high prices). However, welfare increasing effects can only be expectedif Member States, third States and private organizations are allowed to join the competition by providing other standardized contracts. As theregulatory framework created by the EU (choice-of law restriction for consumer contracts and substantive harmonization of Member State laws) ties down all potential competitors, these effects will not materialize. This leads to the conclusion that the Commissionis not seriously pursuing the idea of an optional law, but ultimately means to pre-empt Member States' lawsw it hits proposal.