Acceso usuarios
Adam Cygan
The Treaty of Lisbon addressed the status of regional governance and includes several provisions designed to improve its constitutional relevance. Most importantly Protocol 2 TEU formally engages the Committee of the Regions in the task of subsidiarity monitoring within the Community method. In addition, Articles 5 and 6 TFEU seek to involve regional actors in the process of soft law, but this raises questions of competence creep, legitimacy and accountability. This article analyses participation by the Committee of the Regions in subsidiarity monitoring and the extent to which this may improve the accountability of both the Community method and soft law. The article also examines the accountability paradox that has accompanied the growth of regional autonomy in the EU. Though subsidiarity monitoring may improve legislative legitimacy, the expansion of regional autonomy has created a disjuncture between the exercise of political authority by regions and their accountability for the implementation of EU law.
