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Dietmar von der Pfordten
Modern legal theory is in its mainstream characterized by two fundamental reductionisms. Law is no longer understood with reference to necessary aims like justice, self-preservation, or freedom, but only to contingent means. And the plurality of possible means and elements of law is reduced to norms, rules, and/or principles, therebyneglecting, or at least downsizing, other alternatives like concepts, institutes or institutions. This contribution will confront the second reductionism. This confrontation results in the thesis that concepts play a major role in law, an even greater role than norms. In this article it will be tried to elucidate the role of concepts in law in five steps. First it will be asked what concepts are. Second the appropriate method for conceptual analysis will be analyzed. Third it will be questioned how concepts are related to each other in a conceptual scheme in general. Fourth this understanding of a conceptual scheme in general will be transferred to the conceptual scheme of the law. Fifth in a sort of meta-reflection it will be inquired if concepts or norms are prior in the law.
