Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

• Autores: Douglas Mcdermid
• Localización: Disputatio, ISSN-e 0873-626X, Vol. 1, Nº. 17, 2004, págs. 1-23
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.2478/disp-2004-0010
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are �delusive.� According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle�s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle�s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?