Acceso usuarios
Tamón A. Takahashi Iturriaga
If a government wants to enhance its efficiency in public expenditure, to which kind of incentives should it focus on? On those generated by Budget Negotiation Rules (BNRs) applied to Budget-Spending Officers (BSOs) when drafting their following budget? On those provided by the legal and organisational framework (Framework) under which these officers work in? This issue is analysed following a law and economics perspective. Two types of officers are studied: (T1), who is a BSO within a Line-Ministry, and (T2), who is the BSO of a governmental agency. Further, three different BNRs are compared. At the end, two propositions are proved: (P1) if the same BNR is applied, T1 is less efficient than T2 due to his weaker Framework, and (P2), if (P1) holds, T1 requires a different BNR or a stronger Framework to be as efficient as T2. However, there are some risks, regarding T2, which should be considered.
