Acceso usuarios
Ebrahim Afsah
This is the second release by a research project undertaken by the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University, following the previously reviewed (21 EJIL (2010): 251) From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnhardt (eds), Oxford University Press, 2007). In that commendable first volume, the editors sought to bring a variety of perspectives to bear on the increasingly topical issue of private security providers and their regulation by states. The contributions to that earlier collection were characterized by a distinctly pragmatic approach to the issue, seeking to re-assess the degree to which international law�s categorical proscription of mercenarism remained tenable in a world where most states, rich and poor, view private service providers as an increasingly important part of their military posture.
The common point of departure of both books� contributors is the accurate empirical observation that almost all states, as well as many international and non-governmental organizations, are relying increasingly more strongly on the real or perceived benefits of �outsourcing� certain hitherto public functions to private actors. Somewhat belying its title, which hints at a broader examination, the present book continues the theme of the first volume, namely the regulation of private security providers. This is based on the editors� correct estimate that the perceived benefits accruing to states from their utilization of private actors outweigh normative concerns. Their agenda is therefore a self-consciously pragmatic one in search of �relevance�, with the overriding aim of regulation rather than abolition of private security.
In the pursuit of this goal the editors try in this volume to cast a wider net of empirical and conceptional approaches, trying to extract from the experience with privatization in other industries applicable lessons for the regulation of private violence. They realize that �
