Acceso usuarios
Dapo Akande, Sangeeta Shah
1 Introduction We are grateful to Alexander Orakhelashvili for engaging with the points we make in our recent EJIL article on immunity and international crimes. 1 He has written widely on this issue and his view that international law immunities are not available in judicial proceedings for violations of jus cogens norms is well known. In our article, we disagree with that view and show why that understanding of the relationship between jus cogens norms and international law immunities is untenable. However, it would be wrong to say, as he says, that we �attack� his views (or indeed those of others who share that same perspective). There is, we believe, a reasonable disagreement of view. As is well known, international law provides two types of immunity for state officials from the jurisdiction of foreign states. The first type are �status� immunities (�personal� immunities or immunities ratione personae) and the second is an �official act� immunity (�functional� immunity or immunity ratione materiae). In our view, international law confers two types of �status� immunity: the first type is limited to foreign heads of state and heads of government; it is absolute and applies even in cases alleging international crimes and even where the individual is abroad on private visit. The second type of immunity ratione personae applies only to those abroad on special mission (and therefore in the host state with its consent) and only for the duration of such mission. This special mission immunity is also applicable in cases concerning international crimes. However, we argue that the immunity ratione materiae which international law confers on those who perform official acts on behalf of the state will not be available in cases where the act amounts to an international law crime. This is not because international crimes may not be official acts, or indeed �
