Acceso usuarios
In 2002 the Scottish National Party (SNP) produced a Constitution for Scotland, to be adopted by the people in a referendum upon achieving independence. This Constitution proposed a range of novel devices, such as fixed-term Parliaments, unicameralism, proportional representation, the election of the Prime Minister by Parliament and judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, which were alien to the Westminster Model—although some of these proposals had already been incorporated into the devolved institutions created by the Scotland Act, 1998. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the provisions of the SNPs draft Constitution, from a political rather than legal perspective, focusing on the relationships between Parliament, the Government, the Head of State and the people. The extent to which the draft Constitution represents a rejection of the Westminster model is assessed, and the technical shortcomings of the draft Constitution are highlighted. The paper concludes with some recommendations for changes to the SNPs draft Constitution which could improve the overall design.
