Auctions: how to allocate spectrum rights efficiently

• Autores: Gabriela Antonie, David Colino
• Localización: Cuadernos económicos de ICE, ISSN 0210-2633, ISSN-e 2340-9037, Nº 81, 2011 (Ejemplar dedicado a: ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES EN ESPAÑA), 214 págs.
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.32796/cice.2011.81.6013
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• Referencias bibliográficas
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