Precios de terminación de llamada en telefonía móvil: sus efectos sobre la competencia y el bienestar social

• Autores: Ángel Luis López
• Localización: Cuadernos económicos de ICE, ISSN 0210-2633, ISSN-e 2340-9037, Nº 81, 2011 (Ejemplar dedicado a: ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES EN ESPAÑA), 102 págs.
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.32796/cice.2011.81.6008
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
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