Acceso usuarios
In France, more than other mature democracies, the election rules undergo reform. Our concern is how these reforms influence mass electoral behaviour, namely voter turnout. We gather an extended national data set on the abstention rate, across the republics of France, and subject it to an interrupted time-series analysis. Two sets of hypotheses are explored: structural and tactical. The structural findings—on constitutional shifts, suffrage extension, ballot rounds, election type—are largely null. However, the tactical hypotheses are strongly supported. Ruling parties are shown to alter the election rules, in order to enhance their presidential power at the ballot box. In particular, the reforms surrounding the elections of 1962, 1981, 1988 and 2002 each, systematically, increased abstention in legislative election contests. This reduced turnout can be seen as a reasonable response of voters to the ‘presidentialisation’ of these National Assembly elections, rendering them second order. To the extent that future legislative elections are decoupled from presidential ones, the expectation would be a rise in their voter turnout.
