La lógica de la acción colectiva en la producción de bienes públicos escalares

• Autores: Francisco José León Medina
• Localización: Papers: revista de sociología, ISSN-e 2013-9004, ISSN 0210-2862, Vol. 95, Nº 2, 2010, págs. 363-387
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.5565/rev/papers/v95n2.77
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo, abordamos las características distintivas de la lógica de la acción colectiva en la producción de bienes públicos escalares (bienes con puntos de provisión). En el primer apartado, presentamos las diferencias existentes entre las funciones de producción de bienes públicos continuos (BPC) y las de bienes públicos escalares (BPE). Tras formalizar la situación estratégica en la que los agentes se enfrentan a la producción de un BPE, abordamos sus diferencias teóricas con las situaciones en las que normalmente se ha formalizado la producción de bienes continuos (el dilema de prisionero de n-personas). En tercer lugar, presentamos los hallazgos experimentales más destacados sobre las variables que afectan al nivel de las contribuciones voluntarias y a las tasas de éxito en la producción de BPE. Por último, señalamos algunas razones teóricas y prácticas por las cuales creemos conveniente el desarrollo de la experimentación en juegos de producción de bienes escalares.

  • English

    In this paper, we explore the distinctive features of the logic of collective action in the production of step-level public goods. In the first part, we present the differences between the production functions of continuous public goods (here BPC) and those of the step-level public goods (here BPE). After formalizing the situation where the production of a BPE is pursued, we tackle the theoretical differences between this situation and those in which the BPC are usually formalized (the n-persons prisoners� dilemma). Next, we present the experimental evidence of variables that affect the level of the voluntary contributions and the success rates in the production of BPE. Finally, we point out some of the theoretical and practical reasons for which we believe that a development of the experimentation on step-level public goods games is advisable.

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