Acceso usuarios
G. Zahar Elie
It has been maintained, by bothphilosophers and modern scjentists, that the twa domains of discourse of science and of philosophy are disjoint. Though admitting that many physicists subscribed to metaphysical principies, it was claimed - by Duhem and Reichenbach among others - that the scientist's philosophical convictions play, or shouldplay, no role in his scientiflc work. The presentpaper attempts lo refute this separatist view by showing that Einstein 's metaphysical realism - caupied with his Platonistic panmathematicism - played a crucial role in his construction of the Relativity Programme and in his criticism of Quantum Mechanics (EPRparadox). The article also shows that although Einstein was neither a strict Humean nor a strict Machian, his phenomenalist interpretation of the empirical basis proved ta be an antidote against bath conventianalist scepticism and Neurath's coherence theory of (scientific) truth.
