Acceso usuarios
Claudia Storini 
En este artículo se reflexiona acerca de la posibilidad de establecer la existencia, en la actividad hermenéutica de los Tribunales Constitucionales, de unas directrices o guías interpretativas que una vez especificadas puedan ser utilizadas como parámetro para controlar la juridicidad de la reconducción de la vida constitucional efectiva a las reglas de la Constitución. Todo ello pasando, en primer lugar, por el estudio de dos problemáticas: el papel de la jurisprudencia en el sistema de fuentes y los criterios de interpretación como instrumentos aptos para impedir o facilitar que dicha jurisprudencia pueda ser considerada fuente del Derecho, y, en segundo lugar, de los diferentes instrumentos hermenéuticos que se configuran como enlace entre disposición y norma y sus resultados interpretativos. Todo para llegar a demostrar que la utilización de los diferentes criterios de interpretación no puede ser evaluada por medio de un parámetro externo, como el de la teoría dogmática de la interpretación, sino que ellos se controlan por sí mismos, es decir, que el único control posible es un control de coherencia de su aplicación.The article reflects on the possibility of establishing, within the hermeneutic activity of Constitutional Tribunals, certain interpretative policies or guidelines that may be employed as parameters for controlling lawfulness, while redirecting the constitutional approach in force to the content of the existing Constitution. The article studies two principal problems: first, the role of jurisprudence among other law sources, and interpretation criteria as instruments able to impede and/or facilitate that jurisprudence is considered a source of Law, and, second, the different hermeneutic instruments that are configured as links between laws and the results of their interpretation. The analysis leads to demonstrate that the employment of different interpretation criteria may not be assessed using anexternal parameter such as the dogmatic theory of interpretation. The article concludes that interpretation criteria are auto-controlled, as the only possible control is coherence in their application.
This article reflects on the possibility of establishing, within the hermeneutical activity of Constitutional Courts, interpretive guidelines or principles that, once specified, could be used as a parameter to verify the legality of the alignment of effective constitutional life with the rules of the Constitution. This is achieved, firstly, by examining two issues: the role of jurisprudence within the system of legal sources and the criteria of interpretation as instruments suitable for either preventing or facilitating the consideration of said jurisprudence as a source of law; and, secondly, by examining the different hermeneutical instruments that serve as a link between legal provision and norm, and their interpretive outcomes. The aim is to demonstrate that the use of different criteria of interpretation cannot be evaluated by means of an external parameter, such as the dogmatic theory of interpretation, but rather that they are self-regulating; that is, the only possible control is a control of the consistency of their application.
