Acceso usuarios
Benjamin Gregg
Nonreligious persons —atheists, agnostics, and the unaffiliated— remain systematically marginalized within liberal democracies that profess commitment to pluralism. I show that such exclusion is not accidental but structurally embedded in pluralisms still defined by theological premises. Through a fact-sensitive, non-ideal methodology integrating political theory with social-scientific research, I document the legal asymmetries, social stigma, and symbolic erasure confronting nonbelievers, and argue that liberal neutrality is insufficient to secure genuine inclusion. In response, I develop a model of procedural pluralism treating atheism as the limiting case for democratic legitimacy. Drawing on the Rawlsian tradition of political liberalism, I show that atheism has functioned historically as a structural condition of modern secular institutions and contrast the community-indexed justificatory logic of revealed religion with the procedurally universal logic of democratic public reason. Only the latter can ground legitimate authority under conditions of deep moral and metaphysical disagreement. Recognizing atheism as a comprehensive doctrine capable of grounding ethical life and participating in public reason is therefore a requirement of equal civic standing, and democratic authority must be post-metaphysical: legitimacy should arise from procedures of justification accessible to citizens regardless of their theological commitments.
