Accountability without equality in social relations with thinking animals

• Jon Garthoff ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Tennessee, USA
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 58, Nº. 172, 2026, págs. 249-275
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1789
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Este ensayo arguye que los fenómenos éticos de responsabilidad y recono-cimiento no se basan (como suele creerse) en la capacidad psicológica de pensamientoreflexivo autoconsciente característica de personas. Sabemos esto porque tenemos re-laciones de responsabilidad y reconocimiento con animales que claramente no poseenautoconciencia en tal sentido. Por otro lado, no todos los animales conscientes soncapaces de ejercer responsabilidad o reconocimiento. Así, pues, debemos enfocar-nos en una capacidad intermedia entre la mera conciencia y la autoconciencia paraexplicar la responsabilidad y el reconocimiento.

  • English

    This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition with some animals who are clearly not self-conscious in that sense. On the other hand, not all conscious animals are capable of accountability or recognition. Thus we must focus on a capacity intermediate between mere conscious awareness and self-consciousness in order to explain accountability and recognition.

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