The study of inference in philosophy and comparative psychology

• Giacomo Melis ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Stirling

     University of Stirling

     Reino Unido

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 58, Nº. 172, 2026, págs. 127-157
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1785
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Comparo el estudio de la inferencia en algunas tradiciones filosóficas ypsicológicas a fin de extraer tres conclusiones generales. Primero, sugiero que, tantoen humanos como en animales no humanos, la inferencia es un medio por el cual lossujetos buscan alcanzar una representación precisa y coherente del mundo. Segundo,sostengo que la labor filosófica sobre disposiciones racionales y la investigaciónempírica sobre el razonamiento contribuyen a delinear una noción no reflexivade tomar las premisas como respaldo de laconclusión. Tercero, afirmo que atendera la distinción entre lógica y razonamiento es importante para afinar los parámetrosde observación del razonamiento deductivo en la investigación empírica.

  • English

    I compare the study of inference in some philosophical and psychological traditions, and I make three general points. First, I suggest that in both human and non-human animals, inference is a means by which subjects aim to achieve an accurate and coherent representation of the world. Second, I contend that philosophical work on rational dispositions and empirical research on reasoning helps to outline an unreflective notion of taking the premises to support the conclusion. Third, I claim that paying attention to the distinction between logic and reasoning is important to fine-tune the standards for the observation of deductive reasoning in empirical research.

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