Acceso usuarios
Bell E. Yosef
As populist pressures strain democratic checks and balances globally, parliaments must proactively assert their oversight capacity. This Article, which examines the Israeli case, outlines how legislatures can better hold executives to account. It does so by examining the pathologies underlying weak oversight in the Israeli parliament through an original typology, based on a categorisation into five families: Deficient Structural Infrastructure, Deficient Organisational Infrastructure, Political Culture, Lack of Incentives, and Parliament-Government Dynamics. Moreover, an analysis of interviews, parliamentary documentation, parliamentary procedure, and scholarship reveals not only the causes for the substantial gap between robust oversight mechanisms and their limited use, but also the interaction between these pathologies. This study provides theoretical insights about recurring oversight barriers while offering practical lessons for reform. By illuminating how the Israeli parliament falls short, this case study outlines how other legislatures can better hold executives to account.
