¿Son los niños agentes morales? Sobre el estatus moral de la infancia

• Cabezas, Mar ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Salamanca

     Universidad de Salamanca

     Salamanca, España

     
• Localización: Contrastes: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN-e 2659-921X, ISSN 1136-4076, Vol. 31, Nº 1, 2026
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.24310/contrastes.31.1.2026.19335
• Títulos paralelos:
  • On Children’s Moral Status: Beyond the Notion of Moral Agency
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    Exploro las consecuencias y limitaciones de la noción de agencia moral aplicada la infancia señalando 1) cómo incluso una posición adultocéntrica sobre la agencia moral tendría que considerar a los niños como agentes morales ya que a cumplen sus criterios de autonomía, responsabilidad y conciencia moral; 2) cómo otras estrategias argumentativas centradas en la noción de persona o en conceptos graduales son también problemáticas. Así, sugiero un cambio de enfoque centrado en las condiciones específicas de una acción para evitar tanto la adultización de los niños como el menosprecio de sus experiencias morales qua niños, lo que beneficiaría una ética de la infancia.

  • English

    I explore the consequences and limitations of the notion of moral agency applied to childhood by pointing out 1) how even an adult-centric position on moral agency would have to consider children as moral agents since they meet its criteria of autonomy, responsibility and moral awareness; 2) how other argumentative strategies focused on the notion of person or gradual concepts are also problematic. Thus, I suggest shifting the focus to the specific conditions of an action to avoid both the adultization of children and the belittling of their moral experiences qua children, which may be fruitful for an ethics of childhood.

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